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How a navigation-system upgrade, malicious signals and high-density air traffic (GPS spoofing) nearly collided

The incident

7th November 2025, India’s busiest airport, IGIA in Delhi, experienced a severe disruption of flight operations when multiple incoming aircraft reported anomalous navigation behaviour. According to media reports:

• Navigation Integrity Category (a measure of GPS quality) reportedly dropped from its normal level of 8 to zero in the region around Delhi.
• Fake or manipulated GPS signals (“GPS spoofing”) are strongly suspected to have misled aircraft navigation systems, forcing at least several flights to divert to other airports (Jaipur, Lucknow) despite all four runways at IGIA being nominally operational.
• A technical glitch in the Automatic Message Switching System (AMSS) — handling flight-plan messages at IGIA — compounded delays: more than 400 flights were reported delayed.
• The disruption has been attributed to the coincidence of: (a) the main runway’s Instrument Landing System (ILS) being under upgrade (thus aircraft were more dependent on satellite-based required navigation performance, RNP), and (b) suspicious GPS-spoofing events up to ~60 nautical miles from IGIA.

The regulator Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has reportedly taken cognisance of the situation and launched an inquiry.

Why the crisis unfolded

The disruption unfolded through a chain of vulnerabilities:

1. ILS upgrade left the runway more dependent on GPS/RNP
   IGIA’s main runway, 10/28, was in the process of being upgraded to CAT III ILS (allowing landings in very low visibility). While the ground-based ILS was taken offline or reduced, arriving aircraft had to rely on RNP (satellite-based navigation) rather than the usual ground-based ILS approach. Because RNP relies heavily on GPS (Global Positioning System) signals, the removal of the fallback ILS left aircraft more exposed if GPS signals became unreliable.
2. GPS spoofing suspected in the vicinity
   Reports indicate that fake GPS signals were being broadcast in the region, misleading avionics into calculating wrong positions. According to one account, these fake signals can mislead aircraft by as much as 2,500 km (theoretical estimate). ThePrint notes that such spoofing events are usually seen in conflict zones — India-Pakistan border, Ukraine, etc. — but this appears to be the first known occurrence in Delhi’s civilian airspace.
3. High traffic density and wind-direction change added operational stress
   IGIA handles ~1,500 aircraft movements per day. On days when easterly winds prevailed (forcing landing from the Dwarka side rather than the more usual direction), this increased complexity. The combination of reversed runway operations + spoofing risk + high traffic caused congestion, delays and diversions.

What actually happened, and the scale of disruption

While some reports claimed “GPS spoofing”, “airport stand-still for two hours” and “thousands of lives at risk”, verified data are more modest but still serious:

• Over 400 flights were reported delayed or disrupted.
• At least seven flights were diverted from Delhi to Jaipur or Lucknow.
• Air traffic controllers and airline pilots reportedly issued alerts and reverted to fallback navigation modes.

Thus, while the airport did not shut down entirely for hours, the incident represents one of the largest civilian navigation disruptions in Indian aviation to date.

Was GPS spoofing a terror attack or a malicious act?

Media accounts suggest a malicious act: GPS Spoofing is not typically accidental. Various Media articles describe it as a cyber-electronic warfare tool.

However, no official statement has publicly declared a terrorist group responsible or attributed the attack to a specific actor. Some outlets (such as Zee News) have speculated ties to cross-border adversaries, but those reports lack corroborated evidence.

Therefore, while the scale and sophistication point to a deliberate act, investigators are still gathering evidence. The user’s framing (“alleged terror group hack sending false GPS location to every flight”) is not yet verified in published sources. We need to treat it as an allegation/speculation, not a confirmed fact.

How the “brilliance of Indian traffic control and pilots” averted a catastrophe

While we don’t have detailed official crediting of pilots/controller actions, publicly available accounts note:

• Pilots were alerted to the risk, advised to cross-check GPS position, switch to alternate navigation and ground-based systems where possible.
• Controllers recognised GPS spoofing- the anomaly in Navigation Integrity Category values and responded by adjusting operations, prioritising safety (slowing arrivals, diverting flights).
• Because of the fallback, ILS still being operational on other runways (or other ground-based aids), and aircraft were not forced to rely solely on the spoofed GPS data.

In effect, the operational response prevented a worst-case scenario (for example, an approach guided by a falsified position signal) from materialising. That is indeed commendable, though it should not overshadow the fact that a major vulnerability was exposed.

How serious is the threat?

GPS spoofing- Extremely serious, especially for a high-density airport:

• GPS spoofing undermines the integrity of navigation systems rather than just blocking them. That means an aircraft may believe it is on a safe approach when it is not.
• In this case, aircraft on approach to Delhi could have mis-calculated their position, leading to the risk of collision, terrain impact, wrong runway, or off-airspace deviation.
• The incident occurred at civilian airspace, not in an active warzone, making it unprecedented for Indian commercial aviation.
• The chain of dependencies (ground-based ILS offline, reliance on satellite navigation) highlights a systemic vulnerability in aviation infrastructure.

Lessons for Indian air-traffic safety & mitigation strategies

From this incident of GPS spoofing, several key lessons and action points emerge:

1. Maintain and modernise ground-based navigation aids
   While satellite-based navigation (RNP, GNSS) offers flexibility, ground-based systems like ILS provide essential redundancy. The fact that IGIA’s ILS is being upgraded created the vulnerability, showing how transitional states must be managed carefully. Media experts say retaining ground-based nav is a way “to offset the threat of GPS interference”.
2. Improve detection and monitoring of GPS integrity
   Aviation regulators must require that aircraft and ATC monitor integrity metrics (eg Navigation Integrity Category, RAIM alarms) and have protocols for spoofing/jamming events. In this case, the drop from 8 → 0 was alarming.
3. Develop contingency navigation and operational procedures
   Pilots and controllers need standard operating procedures for when GPS navigation reliability is compromised: fallback to ILS, surveillance sensors, manual sequencing, diversion protocols. Airlines at IGIA reportedly issued advisories to pilots.
4. Cyber-electronic threat awareness and resilience in aviation infrastructure
   Aviation must treat GPS spoofing/jamming not just as a technical glitch but as a cyber-electronic warfare threat. These are “acts of warfare” when they occur in civilian contexts.
5. Coordination between aviation, defence, intelligence and telecommunications agencies
   Because GPS spoofing may originate from malicious actors (state-sponsored or terrorist-linked) transmitting fake GNSS signals, aviation authorities need to coordinate with defence/EW/intel agencies to trace sources, attribute and block them. India has prior data of hundreds of GPS interference incidents near the India-Pakistan border.
6. International benchmarking and best practice adoption
   India should analyse how other nations and airports detect and counter GPS spoofing/interference, adopt anti-spoofing modules, and strengthen resilience programmes.

Global precedents & how others handled GPS-spoofing

While civilian aviation GPS spoofing is still relatively rare, there are documented cases and best practices:

• In conflict zones such as Ukraine/Black Sea region, commercial aircraft have been subjected to GPS jamming/spoofing.
• In one example, an aircraft’s ADS-B signal disappeared in Russian jamming territory; this underscores the risk of GNSS interference.
• Aviation regulators and international bodies (International Civil Aviation Organisation – ICAO) recommend multi-sensor navigation, integrity monitoring, and retention of ground-based aids.
• European experience: for example, a charter plane carrying Ursula von der Leyen in 2025 experienced suspected GPS jamming over Bulgaria; this prompted EU states to increase anti-spoofing measures.

Attribution, motive & the geopolitical dimension

In social media, many channels, threads and comments suggested “terror group hack” and “roots in Pakistan/Bangladesh” — however, current public reporting does not confirm this. What we do know:

• The India-Pakistan border region has seen 465 GPS-spoofing or jamming incidents between Nov 2023–February 2025.
• The location of the spoof signals (up to 60 nautical miles from IGIA) suggests a terrestrial transmitter rather than accidental local interference.
• Aviation analysts have warned that “enemy actors” could target civil navigation infrastructure as part of broader hybrid warfare strategies.

So while an attribution to a specific terror or state-actor network cannot be asserted in this article (given the lack of open evidence), the strategic risk is clearly amplified by India’s contested border environment.

What happens now – the response and next steps

• The DGCA has accelerated reinstatement of ILS on IGIA’s runway 10/28: CAT I ILS is being brought online earlier than planned (originally slated Nov 27) to reduce reliance on GPS/RNP.
• Pilots and airlines have been issued advisories to cross-check GPS data, remain alert for anomalous navigation reads, and revert to alternate navigation systems when needed.
• A full inquiry is underway to determine the spread, origin and impact of the spoof-signals, and whether the incident qualifies as cyber-electronic sabotage.
• A wider review of India’s air-traffic control automation, navigation aid resiliency, and contingency procedures is now getting renewed urgency.

What this incident teaches us: a summary

• Civil aviation systems, once thought insulated, are vulnerable to electronic/cyber attacks on navigation.
• Technology upgrades (such as installing new ILS) must ensure transitional fallback systems remain robust.
• High-density airports like IGIA are especially exposed because any navigation anomaly quickly cascades through traffic flows.
• Mitigation requires multi-layered defence: ground-based navigation aids + continuous integrity monitoring + operational procedures + threat awareness + coordination with security/intel.
• India must treat GPS spoofing in its domestic airspace as not just an air-traffic issue, but a national-security threat.

Final word

What unfolded at IGIA serves as a warning: modern aviation increasingly relies on satellite navigation, but that reliance brings vulnerabilities — especially in contested geographies. The most worrying part is not just the delay of 400+ flights, but the possibility that without quick recognition and fallback, a large-scale accident could have occurred. Thankfully, Indian air-traffic controllers and pilots detected and managed the anomaly before catastrophe. But the question remains: Are we ready next time?

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